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In this paper we show that optimistic financial expectations impact positively on both the quantity of 
debt and the growth in debt, at the individual and household levels. Our theoretical model shows that 
this association is predicted under a variety of plausible scenarios. In the empirical analysis we explore 
the determinants of debt and of growth in debt using British data. We find convincing support for our 
theoretical priors and show that it is optimistic financial expectations per se that are important in 
influencing debt, rather than the accuracy of individuals’ predictions regarding their future financial 
situation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The last decade has witnessed a consumer credit explosion on both sides of the Atlantic, accompanying 
the sustained economic boom. In the U.K. the amount of unsecured borrowing accumulated by 
individuals and households, as a proportion of GDP, has more than doubled since 1993 to 16 per cent.
1 
At the end of the third quarter of 2003 the total amount of unsecured debt was nearly £168 billion, or 
more than £4,000 for every adult of working age. Consequently policymakers are particularly interested 
in understanding what factors drive the decision to acquire increasing amounts of debt and whether or 
not such indebtedness is sustainable. 
There is also considerable concern from social welfare lobbyists about the associated increase in 
personal debt problems experienced by individuals and families. For example, the National Association 
of Citizens Advice Bureau in the U.K.,
2 whose members dealt with approximately one million personal 
debt enquiries during 2001, reported a 39% increase in the number of new contacts in this area over the 
previous 4 years. Furthermore, they have highlighted the dramatic increase in the availability of 
unsecured consumer credit in the U.K. over the past 25 years.
3 Changes include the massive rise in the 
number of different credit cards available (1,300 in 2000) and the increase in the range of financial 
institutions offering unsecured loans. From being primarily the preserve of the major (high street) 
banks, consumers can now also obtain loans from building societies, U.K. and overseas-based finance 
companies and even supermarkets. In addition, the advent of telephone and internet-banking, and the 
availability of credit at the point of purchase have increased the accessibility of consumer credit and the 
speed with which loans can be obtained. 
  Amongst academic economists, research into the determinants of individual debt or household 
level debt is surprisingly scarce.
4 This is somewhat puzzling as the most common reasons for debt 
problems, including job loss and poverty, are all closely related to economics. One explanation for this 
is the lack of available data on debt, at the individual and household level, especially in the U.K. In this 
paper we partially redress the imbalance in the existing research, using recently available data. 
  2 Our broad aim is to explore the determinants of debt and the growth in debt at the individual 
and household level. We focus on one particular influence on the decision to acquire increasing 
amounts of debt, namely the financial expectations of individuals and households. Our theoretical 
framework predicts a positive association between individuals who are optimistic about their future 
financial situation and the amount of debt they acquire. In our empirical analysis, using samples 
derived from the 1995 and 2000 waves of the British Household Panel Survey, we find consistent 
statistical support for our main proposition. 
  The paper is set-out as follows: Section II reviews existing research in this area; Section III 
presents our theoretical framework; Section IV describes our data and methodology; Section V presents 




The economic psychology literature represents one area where there has been significant interest in the 
determinants of personal debt. Livingstone and Lunt (1992) analyse the determinants of the level of 
debt and repayments across individuals and find that attitudinal factors, such as whether individuals are 
pro or anti debt, are key determinants. Similarly, Lea et al. (1993) analyse individual level survey data 
and find that debt is correlated with economic, social and psychological factors. Individuals classified 
as ‘serious’ debtors are found to be characterised by low socio-economic class, low income and are less 
likely to be owner occupiers. The importance of economic factors in determining the extent of debt is 
also confirmed by Lea et al. (1995). 
Davies and Lea (1995) analyse student attitudes towards debt and interpret their results in the 
context of a life-cycle theory of economic behaviour. Here, students borrow in order to finance their 
investment in human capital in anticipation of higher expected future income. Although, the authors do 
not explicitly focus on expectations, it is apparent that these play a key role in any life-cycle model.  
Godwin (1997) explores the dynamics of households’ use of credit and attitudes towards credit, 
using U.S. panel data. The findings suggest that there was considerable mobility in debt status during 
  3 the 1980s, with the majority of households in a different debt quintile in 1989 relative to 1983. In 
addition, attitudes towards credit became more negative over the 1980s. In a more recent U.S. study, 
Crook (2001) finds that income, home ownership and family size all impact positively upon the level of 
U.S. household debt. Interestingly, expectations of future changes in interest rates appear to have no 
impact on household debt.
5
One intriguing puzzle observed by Gross and Souleles (2002) in the behaviour of credit card 
holders is their apparent targeting of a specific credit utilisation rate, with the consequent failure to 
eliminate costly outstanding balances using available liquid assets. Bertaut and Haliassos (2002) 
propose an accountant-shopper model of household expenditure to explain the phenomenon of such 
“debt-revolvers”.
6 Together with Haliassos and Reiter (2003), Bertaut and Haliassos (2002) provide 
corroborating evidence from the 1995 and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finance.  
Credit constraints on individuals and households are an important issue in the literature. Japelli 
(1990) reports that 19% of his sample of U.S. households are either unable to obtain any loans at all or 
are discouraged from seeking credit due to past refusals. In addition, many individuals and households 
may incur debt, but to a lesser extent than desired. Therefore actual debt levels reported in sample 
surveys may fail to reflect the demand for credit, particularly amongst the young.
7 Cox and Japelli 
(1993) estimate the size of the gap between desired and achieved debt levels for the U.S. and find that, 
on average, desired debt levels are 75% higher than actual levels. Gross and Souleles (2002) 
demonstrate directly that borrowing constraints appear to be binding for many credit card holders as 
debt levels are observed to rise in response to increases in credit limits. 
A further strand of the literature explores the consequences of default. In the U.S., bankruptcy 
law favours debtors considerably. As White (2003) shows, risk-averse borrowers can obtain partial 
wealth insurance through their residential location, careful management of their assets and their 
strategic choice of legal bankruptcy route, also noted in Fay et al. (2002). This makes borrowing more 
attractive to opportunistic individuals and households.
8 Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) show that borrowers 
have a greater incentive to acquire sequential loans in the presence of moral hazard, as the likelihood of 
repayment declines with rising debt levels. Indeed, Gropp et al. (1997) have shown that the level of 
  4 bankruptcy exemptions influences the accumulation of total debt amongst U.S. households. Lin and 
White (2001) extend the empirical analysis to the case of secured debt and also show that higher 
exemption levels lead to credit rationing. 
In one of the few papers based on U.K. data, Bridges and Disney (2002) explore access to 
credit, default and arrears among low-income U.K. households. The results indicate that differences in 
the incidence of credit and default across households are influenced by labour market status, age, 
access to social security benefits and household composition. Finally, their empirical analysis is 
conducted at the household level, implying that the determinants of personal debt are also at the level 
of the household rather than at the level of the individual.  
 
Financial Expectations 
At the macroeconomic level, a number of studies, such as McNabb and Taylor (2002), have 
investigated the impact of consumer expectations upon either business cycle trends or household 
consumption patterns, as in Acemoglu and Scott (1994) for the U.K. and Carroll et al. (1994) for the 
U.S. The findings suggest that expectations impact upon the life-cycle consumption activities of 
households. Surprisingly, empirical analysis into how expectations influence the consumption (and 
savings) decisions of individuals has been somewhat scarce. 
One reason for this may be the fact that scepticism about the use of information derived from 
subjective survey data still prevails in the economics literature, as Dominitz and Manski (1997) note. 
There are, however, a number of recent studies which exploit subjective information on income 
expectations, such as Guiso et al. (1992; 1996) and Japelli and Pistaferri (2000). Similarly, Donkers and 
Van Soest (1999) include subjective information such as time preference and risk aversion, available in 
a panel survey of Dutch households, to measure household preferences. Although they do not have 
access to information on financial expectations and focus on one specific type of debt (mortgages). 
They conclude that psychological variables are useful in analysing household behaviour under 
uncertainty in a life-cycle context. 
  5   The importance of expectations in determining the decision to save at the individual level has 
also been explored in the economic psychology literature. For example, Vanden Abeele (1988) reports 
a significant relationship between optimism and short-term saving. Similarly, Lunt and Livingstone 
(1991) find that saving is related to optimism about personal economic circumstances as well as 
optimism regarding the economy as a whole. 
In the related literature on the demand for consumer durables, expectations play an important 
role. Pickering (1981) argues that models of the demand for consumer durables should include the 
nature of the decision-making process within the household, as well as consumers’ expectations of 
general and personal economic conditions. Winer (1984) argues that such models should be refined by 
jointly modelling expectations of personal financial conditions and those for the general economic 
outlook. Similarly, Van Raaij and Gianotten (1990) explore the role of expectations in consumer 
spending using individual level survey data. The questions relate to individuals’ evaluations and 
expectations regarding the general economic situation, including inflation and unemployment, as well 
as expectations about household finances. Such information is found to partially explain consumer 
credit. 
In sum, these studies stress the importance of expectations but do not explicitly focus on debt. 
However, Van Raaij and Gianotten (1990, 271) comment that ‘optimistic consumers tend to … borrow 
more than pessimistic consumers. Consumer credit and mortgages tend to increase when consumers are 
in an optimistic mood’. In the remainder of this paper, we explore the validity of this assertion, in the 
context of individual and household debt, from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. 
 
III. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
Some insight into the relationship between debt and expectations can be discerned from a simple life-
cycle model. We present two versions of this model below. The first version is a stylised two period 
example of consumption and saving choice with uncertain consumer income. An exogenous upper 
bound on credit ensures that there are sufficient funds to repay any borrowing even when realised 
income is low. The second version is a three period extension of the first, where a lower bound on 
  6 credit determines repayment difficulties in the middle period and the third period is used as a device for 
a possible loan extension. The two period version provides the basic intuition for the positive 
relationship between ‘optimistic’ expectations of future income and the optimally chosen size of debt. 
The three period version confirms this intuition in the more general adverse case where consumers with 
low income are forced to take on more borrowing to face liquidity crises. Both versions consider the 
choice of borrowers and lenders simultaneously and are thus based on equilibrium, which reflects the 
competitive nature of personal sector finance in the U.S. and U.K. We also briefly consider some 
refinements of the basic scenario, such as the extent of liability of borrowers, the effect of over-
optimistic expectations and the role of collateral. Our finding that optimistic financial expectations 
increase the level of debt is again valid in these more general scenarios. 
 
Basic Intuition 
Consider representative consumers living two periods t=1,2, who can borrow or save freely between 
periods at the safe ongoing (and for simplicity constant
9) interest factor of R>1. There is full 
information - so lenders can observe the circumstances of borrowers at no cost and enforce the 
specifications of any loan agreement. Consumers have a twice differentiable and strictly concave utility 
function   where   is consumption, whose price is normalised to 1. Time preference equals the 
inverse of the safe interest factor and there are no bequests. Competitive risk neutral lenders seek to 
make zero expected profits from lending an amount L to consumers. First period income,  , is 
certain and second period income,  , is uncertain, with two income states: a high state, y
) U(Ct Ct
  0     y1 >
  0     y2 > 2H, 
occurring with exogenous probability p; and a low state, y2L, occurring with probability 1-p, where 
0<p<1 and 0 < y2L < y2H. The probability p represents the common expectation of borrower and lender 
that future financial circumstances will be favourable. So p, y2H   and y2L describe a simple two-point 
distribution for income. 
Borrowers can always repay the debt, i.e. L < y2L/R.  The upper bound on loan size will be 
relaxed later on. Consumption in each realised state of second period income is obtained directly from 
the budget constraint. In the first period consumers maximise lifetime expected utility: 
  7 ()( ) ( ) ( ) ( /R RL y U p 1 RL y pU L y U 2L 2H 1 − − ) + − + +            ( 1 )  
with first order condition:  
()( ) ( ) (RL y U' p 1 RL y pU' L y U' 2L 2H 1 ) − − + − = +         ( 2 )  
Free entry in a perfectly competitive financial market ensures that the zero expected profit condition of 
the lender is trivially satisfied. The size of the loan supply is indeterminate, as expected with constant 
returns to scale. Simple comparative statics gives:
10
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) () 0 > − − + − + + − − − = ∂ ∂ RL y ' U' p 1 RL y ' pU' R L y ' U' / RL y U' RL y U' p L/ 2L 2H 1 2L 2H  
             ( 3 )  
where both numerator and denominator are negative by concavity. So consumption smoothing explains 
the positive correlation between ‘optimistic’ financial expectations, p, and the optimally chosen size of 
debt, L. The wider the spread between second period income realisations, the stronger this effect.  
 
Repayment Difficulties 
Now assume that in the low state of second period income, consumer loans cannot be feasibly repaid. 
Lenders will grant loans to consumers in the first place so long as, on average, they expect to recover 
their monies, i.e. L < (py2H+(1-p)y2L)/R. But they also impose a lower bound on L such that L > y2L/R. 
This may be because it is costly for the lender to set up the loan below this level or because the value of 
y2L is very close to zero (e.g. a basic form of income support). We consider unsecured lending and 
assume that borrowers are protected by limited liability. At the end of the section we relax both 
assumptions and see that they imply no loss of generality. So if the borrower is unable to repay in the 
second period, the lender cannot seize y2L.
11  
Instead, the lender may consider a partial repayment of the existing loan, equal to gRL, where g 
is an exogenous percentage (e.g. the minimum repayment of 3% of the existing balance for most credit 
cards). The borrower could meet this repayment out of second period income, y2L, plus extra funds 
coming from a new loan, L', to be repaid in the third period together with the remainder of the existing 
loan, (1-g)RL, at a new interest factor R' > 1, so long as the expected resources of the borrower allow 
the lender to break even on this new agreement. To keep matters tractable, we assume that third period 
  8 income y3 is certain
12 and that there are no anticipated liquidity problems, i.e. L'< y3/R'.
13  In other 
words, loan extensions are bounded above to stop consumers dying in debt. We will relax this 
assumption at the end of the section, when we examine the possibility of default. 
The lender offers the new loan if he/she is no worse off, in so doing, than investing in the safe 
capital market instead. Evaluated at period 2 this gives the condition: 
() L /R L' g)RL - (1 R'   L' - gRL = + +           ( 4 )  
which reduces to:  
R R'=               ( 5 )  
in equilibrium. The loan supply size is again indeterminate and with competitive risk neutral lenders 
this makes sense - for sufficient third period borrower resources, consumption smoothing occurs at the 
safe rate R
14 and the size of lending is set by loan demand. Reality is very similar - borrowers with 
repayment difficulties often end up ‘spreading’ their debt over a longer period of time, with initial low 
repayments and accumulated debt carried later in life. Typically the payment factor g includes early 
payment penalties but also ‘knocks down’ some of the interest due under the existing agreement.
15 
Given condition (5), the choice of L' in period 2 leads to full consumption smoothing
16 and to the 
demand for loan extensions L' (as a function of L fixed from the past): 
( R) /(1 g)R) - (1 - RL(g y y     L' 2L 3 + + − = )
)
         ( 6 )  
The choice for the high income borrower is straightforward. Firstly, there is enough liquidity to repay 
the existing loan, i.e. L < y2H/R. This follows from L < (py2H + (1-p)y2L)R and L > y2L/R. Secondly, the 
lender has full information. Thus a high income borrower is prevented from cheating - pretending to be 
a low income type - because the lender can enforce the original agreement. Thirdly, the high income 
borrower has access to the instrument L' to fully
17 smooth out consumption between periods 2 and 3 
and obtain:
18
() R) /(1 RL y y     L' 2H 3 + + − =            ( 7 )  
By equations (5)-(6) lifetime expected utility is then: 
() ( ) (
2
2L 2H 1 /R ) U(C p - 1 ) pU(C R) (1 L y U + + + +         ( 8 )  
  9 where:  
( ) R) /(1 L R Ry y C
2
2H 3 2H + − + =          ( 9 )  
( ) R) /(1 L R Ry y C
2
2L 3 2L + − + =          ( 1 0 )  
with the first order condition:  
()( ) ( ) ( 2L 2H 1 C U' p 1 C pU' L y U' − + = + )         ( 1 1 )    
The interior solution in L gives the consumer's demand for loans as a function of the model's 
parameters, which forms the basis of our empirical investigation. And by concavity: 
() () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 R) /(1 C ' U' p 1 C ' pU' R L y ' U' / C U' C U' p L/ 2L 2H
2
1 2L 2H > + − + + + − = ∂ ∂    (12) 
So, as expected, the positive relationship between optimal loan size and ‘optimistic’ financial 
expectations carries through to the more general scenario where consumers have repayment difficulties. 
In fact, what operates here is a moral hazard argument. Given lifetime expected resources and the 
market conditions available in case of repayment difficulties (a payment of gRL and a further loan L' at 
the equilibrium rate R'=R), consumers want to take on as much debt as possible. Heightened 




Under the current setting the lender always grants a new loan in period 2 because the alternative is to 
receive zero from the low income borrower: on the one hand y2L/R < L and, on the other hand, limited 
borrower liability prevents the lender from seizing y2L. However, if the borrower has unlimited liability 
then the lender can seize y2L, so long as he/she is able to charge high income borrowers a factor R' set 
to satisfy zero expected profits:
20
() 2L y p - 1 L pR' RL + =             ( 1 3 )  
That is: 
/L)/p y p)(R - (1 R R' 2L − + =            ( 1 4 )  
where L > y2L/R implies R' > R. So R' includes a default premium. For the lender to offer this loan in 
the first place a recursive credit constraint must also be satisfied:  
  10    )/R' p)y - (1     (py       L 2L 2H + <            ( 1 5 )  
where R' is set by equation (14).
21 In accordance with the literature on credit rationing [Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981], equation (15) is more binding when R' is high, which, from equation (14), happens when 
y2L is low and p is high.
22 In particular, the ‘over-optimistic’ borrowers (for whom p takes its maximum 
value of 1) interpret the credit constraint (15) as L < y2H/R. But since y2H/R >(py2H+(1-p)y2L)/R' from 
equation (14), these borrowers may find themselves rationed by lenders.
23 This is only possible if the 
loan L at rate R' is the sole financial instrument available to borrowers between periods 1 and 2 and 
only if lenders can legally enforce the loan agreement once the second period state is realised – which 
they can do when borrowers have unlimited liability. Otherwise, high income borrowers would switch 
to the safe capital market in period 2, to avoid paying the higher interest R'. This would create complete 
credit rationing: only defaulters would require L at R' but the lender could not offer this loan since 
equation (13) is violated. Also, the lender’s problem no longer has constant returns to scale, since R' 
depends on L. So in equilibrium the lender chooses R' on the basis of equation (14), where the optimal 
size of L is set by loan demand, obtained by maximising the borrower’s lifetime expected utility subject 
to equation (14). To avoid this extra layer of analysis we have preferred to specify, at the start of this 
section, a simpler limited liability model where borrowers cannot end up with zero consumption. 
However, optimistic financial expectations continue to have a positive effect on debt when borrowers 
have unlimited liability.
24  
The above discussion indicates that unlimited liability is also akin to secured lending. In order 
to prevent the defaulting low income borrower from switching to the safe capital market in period 2, 
the current lender has first claim on the borrower’s resources y2L. Hence whenever future prospects of 
the borrower are low, i.e. y3/R < L, the lender prefers to enforce default and seize y2L rather than re-
finance the borrower at the safe rate R.
25 Furthermore, the unlimited liability framework can be adapted 
to represent collateralised lending - that is, lending secured not only on borrower income but also on a 
particular borrower asset. Let kt denote the price of collateral at t=1,2,3. Then equation (14) becomes:  
() ( /p /L k y R p) (1 R R' 2 2L + − − + = )           ( 1 6 )  
  11  where a higher value of collateral in the relevant period, k2, reduces the gap between the safe rate, R, 
and the ‘value to loan’ ratio, (y2L+ k2)/L - also reducing the gap between R' and R. This accords with 
the observation that secured loans are offered at lower rates than unsecured loans and credit cards, even 
for common loan terms. At the limit, when collateral is sufficiently high to raise the LHS of y2/R < L to 
(y2L+ k2)/L = R, equation (16) reduces to R'=R. Default is then no longer necessary, since our three 
period loan extension model would apply, so long as (y3+ k3)/R > L. Otherwise, default could occur. 
Note also that the no default credit constraint is less binding in the case of a collateralised loan than in 
the case of an unsecured loan or a loan secured only on income, where the constraint is tighter at y3/R > 
L. On the other hand, it is not entirely clear whether collateral strengthens the agents’ response to 
optimistic financial expectations, although we predict that in general it will: the sign of ∂
2L/∂p∂kt is 
more likely to be positive the stronger the degree of convexity of marginal utility, i.e. the stronger the 
precautionary savings motive in preferences.
26 Hence, our theoretical prediction of a positive 
relationship between optimistic financial expectations and debt accumulation is robust to the 
refinements introduced in this section. 
 
 
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In the remainder of the paper, we explore the empirical determinants of the amount of debt at both the 
individual and household level in Great Britain, focusing on the role of financial expectations. We 
exploit information contained in the 1995 and 2000 waves of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), which are the only two years when questions related to debt were included. The BHPS is a 
random sample survey, carried out by the Institute for Social and Economic Research, of each adult 
member from a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 private households (yielding 
approximately 10,000 individual interviews). For Wave one, interviews were conducted during the 
autumn of 1991. The same individuals are re-interviewed in successive waves - the latest available 
being wave twelve, collected in 2002.  
  In 1995 and 2000, respondents were asked: how much in total do you owe? This question relates 
to non-mortgage debt as details about mortgages are asked in a separate question.
27 The answers thus 
  12  provide information on the amount of outstanding debt. There is also further information on the type of 
debt (e.g. hire purchase, personal loan and credit card) although the specific amount for each type is not 
given. Surprisingly there is a distinct lack of alternative datasets for Great Britain, which contain 
information related to the amount of debt at the individual and household level.
28 The defining feature 
of the BHPS, for the purpose of our study, is that it contains information on the total amount of debt, at 
the individual and household level, as well as individuals’ expectations about their future financial 
situation. There are, however, some limitations to the information provided in the BHPS. In particular, 
there is no information on the time period over which the debt was accumulated – we simply have a 
measure of the extent of indebtedness at a point in time.
29 This issue is explored in greater depth later 
on. 
Our sample includes the employed and self-employed aged between sixteen and sixty-five.
30 
We exclude the unemployed thereby concentrating on a more homogenous group. One would predict, 
for example, that credit rationing is relatively more stringent for the unemployed. Figures 1 and 2 
below illustrate the distribution of debt across all employees and self-employees for 1995 and 2000. It 
is apparent that there are a significant number of individuals reporting zero personal debt.  
The focus of our paper is to explore the effect of an individual’s expectations of his/her future 
financial situation on the current extent of indebtedness. In the BHPS, respondents are asked the 
following question (with the response rates given in parentheses): 
Looking ahead, how do you think you will be financially a year from now, will you be: 
      1995        2000
Better off…………………………….   (30.9%)   (30.2%) 
Worse off than you are now…………   (11.4%)   ( 6.8%) 
Or about the same?…………………..   (54.6%)   (60.3%) 
Don’t know…………………………..   ( 3.1%)    ( 2.7%) 
Answers to this question implicitly incorporate a synthesis of an individuals’ own financial outlook 
(e.g. pay and job security) with their expectations about the general economic environment (e.g. future 
interest rates and unemployment).  We construct a Financial Expectations Index (FEI) where 
individuals who answer ‘Worse off’ to the above question are coded as ‘0’, those who answer as 
‘About the same’ are coded ‘1’ as are people who respond ‘Don’t know’, whilst individuals who 
  13  answer ‘Better off’ are coded as ‘2’. Thus the index ranks individuals according to their financial 
expectations from having a bleak outlook to being optimistic about their financial future. In the 
following, our aim is to explore how such financial expectations influence debt levels. 
 
Random Effects Approach 
We initially explore the data for 1995 and 2000, separately, adopting a random effects approach 
whereby the panel dimension relates to multiple observations of individuals within households. There 
is some variation in sample size across 1995 and 2000 with 1,561 and 1,779 households, respectively. 
The mean number of observations within the household in 1995 (2000) is 1.8 (1.6) and the total number 
of individuals is 2,700 (2,705).   
We initially explore the determinants of the logarithm of the amount of outstanding debt.
31 
Since we do not know over what time period the debt was accumulated, here we do not weight debt by 
income or wealth. By definition debt cannot be negative and so it is a censored variable. Hence, our 
approach to estimating the determinants of debt is to implement a random effects Tobit model to allow 
for the fact that a number of individuals report zero debt, following Bertaut and Starr-McCluer 
(2002).
32 Hence, we estimate the following: 
()      ν FEI β X β d ln hi hi 2 hi 1
*
hi + ′ + ′ =           ( 1 7 )  
where: 
( ) ( )
( ) otherwise 0    d ln








          ( 1 8 )  
  η α ν   hi h hi + =             ( 1 9 )  
where the debt of individual i in household h is given by  such that i=1,…,n with i  hi d ∈ h & 
h=1,…,nh,   denotes a vector of personal characteristics,   represents the index of financial 
expectations of individual i in household h,   represents the ‘household’ specific unobservable effect 
and   is a random error term,  . Our theoretical framework [see equations (3) and 
hi X hi FEI
h α
hi η ) σ IN(0, ~ η
2
h hi
  14  (12)], predicts  . We assume that   is  0 β2 > h α ( ) 2
α σ 0, IN  and independent of   and  . The 
correlation between the error terms of individuals in the same household is a constant given by: 
hi η hi X





α ik il ≠ + = = /            ( 2 0 )  
where   represents the proportion of the total unexplained variance in the dependant variable 
contributed by the panel level variance component. The magnitude of ρ indicates the extent of the 




To explore the robustness of the results derived from the random effects approach, we investigate the 
determinants of household level debt, based on the sum of individuals’ reported debt within each 
household, where each unit of observation relates to the head of household. Thus, the sample is heads 
of households only and the dependant variable is household debt: 
( )     ε FEI β X β d ln i i 2 i 1 h i i + ′ + ′ = ∑ ∈           ( 2 1 )  
where i = 1,…,nh with nh representing the number of heads of households. Figures 3 and 4 below 
illustrate the distribution of household debt across households, with an employed or self-employed 
head of household, for 1995 and 2000, respectively. In accordance with the distribution of individual 
debt, the figures indicate that there are a significant number of households reporting zero debt. 
Although the focus of our paper lies in the role of financial expectations, we include a number 
of controls in our econometric analysis for personal and demographic characteristics in the vectors   
and   [see equations (17) and (21), respectively].  These explanatory variables include variables 
relating to the individual’s financial situation. Specifically, we incorporate controls for lifetime income, 
as the amount of debt undertaken by the individual or household could be influenced by how one 
expects income to vary over the life-cycle. We have income data from 1991 onwards, and so include 
current and lagged gross usual monthly income variables to control for past income (i.e. income in each 
year 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994). In addition, we include explanatory variables such as highest 
educational qualification, firm size, occupation and industry affiliation, which arguably influence 
hi X
i X
  15  lifetime income. Explanatory variables are also incorporated to control for employment status, 
including dummy variables for if unemployed in the previous wave, whether the individual has a 
second job or a permanent contract.  
We also control for an individual’s wealth by including the natural logarithm of total savings 
plus total investments, a dummy variable controlling for the receipt of a windfall and the natural 
logarithm of house value (if owned without a mortgage). We also control for the natural logarithm of 
spouse’s gross usual monthly pay, the total outstanding mortgage as a proportion of income, whether 
any of the debt is a joint responsibility and a dummy variable indicating whether the individual has an 
additional mortgage.  
Demographic characteristics controlled for include marital status, the number of children (aged 
less than 18), region of residence, household size and car ownership. Finally, we also control for the 
month of interview as debt may have a seasonal component. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the 
variables used in our analysis for 1995 and 2000. These relate to individual level data – household level 
statistics are available from the authors on request. For each year, we provide two sets of summary 
statistics – those for all individuals and, in parentheses, those reporting positive debt only. 
 
Growth in Debt 
To gain an understanding of the determinants of debt accumulation over time, we also explore the 
growth in debt between 1995 and 2000. Ideally, in the econometric analysis described above we would 
weight debt by income or wealth so as to ascertain the degree of debt an individual or household holds 
in relation to other assets. However, due to the nature of the debt question we do not know the time 
period over which debt has been accumulated, i.e. the debt may have been acquired in the last year or 
over a longer period of time (a stock). Consequently, because the trajectory of debt is unobservable, it 
is unclear as to how one would weight the amount of debt [see Bridges and Disney (2002)]. However, 
since we know the amount of debt in 1995 and 2000, the growth in debt between 1995 and 2000 can be 
calculated. We are then able to weight the difference in individual debt by total annual income over the 
period 1995 to 2000:  
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where   represents a vector of personal characteristics, with    denoting the Financial 
Expectations Index in both current year (t=2000) and lags t-1 (1999) through to t-5 (1995), thus 
controlling for individual financial expectations over the six-year interval (1995-2000). We define   
to represent the ‘household’ specific unobservable effect and   is a random error term, 
. We assume that   is 
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λ σ 0, IN  and independent of   and  . Hence, the 
correlation between the error terms of individuals in the same household, which captures the extent to 
which unobserved household specific factors explain growth in debt, is given by ρ. 
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It is not possible to use a simple difference of income in the denominator of equation (22) since 
we only know the growth in debt. Consequently, we estimate a log growth in debt model, weighted by 
total annual income over the period 1995 to 2000, by random effects. Figure 5 shows how the 
dependent variable is distributed, where again we focus upon a logarithmic measure following Gropp et 
al. (1997).
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We also explore whether the results derived for individual level growth in debt hold at the 
household level, based upon the growth in household level debt weighted by household income, where 
each observation relates to the head of household. Here, the sample consists of heads of household only 
and the dependent variable is the growth in household debt as a proportion of household income: 
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  17  V. RESULTS 
In this section, we initially discuss the determination of the amount of debt, followed by the growth in 
debt and focus attention on whether financial expectations have a role to play. In the following 
discussion, the key coefficients of interest are shown in bold in Table 2. For brevity, only the 
coefficients of interest are reported in Tables 3, 5 and 6. 
 
The Amount of Debt at the Individual Level: Random Effects Analysis 
The results presented in Table 2, below, relate to the impact of financial expectations in the current year 
of interview upon the log amount of debt. The first two columns of Table 2 present estimates based 
upon the random effects Tobit estimator for 1995 and 2000.  
Interestingly, in both years, current and lagged income has no significant impact on the amount 
of debt undertaken. Rather the value of the house is significant in determining the amount of debt,
34 
along with marital status and whether the individual has a second job. Noticeably the amount of savings 
and investments, employment status and contract type are only significant for individual years, not 
both, and spouse’s income, or whether the individual was unemployed in the previous year generally 
have no significant impacts upon debt in either years. 
The predictions of our theoretical model suggest that optimistic financial expectations should 
impact positively on the amount of debt. Indeed, focusing upon the 1995 and 2000 results for 
individuals, this is found to be the case. The financial expectations index (FEI), which ranks individuals 
from having pessimistic to optimistic financial expectations, is characterised by a relatively large 
positive and significant coefficient. Interestingly, it is noticeably larger in 2000. In both 1995 and 2000, 
ρ is very small at 0.085 and 0.057, respectively, implying that unobserved intra-household correlations 
explain very little of the residual variance. 
 
The Amount of Debt at the Household Level: Cross Section Analysis 
The final two columns of Table 2 relate to the determinants of debt at the household level based upon 
equation (21). Essentially, the model is the same except that we are now estimating a standard cross 
  18  section Tobit model for each year, with debt and income (current and lagged) defined at the household, 
rather than the individual, level. The results are consistent with those based upon individual level debt, 
in that male heads of households are found to have lower debt (in 1995), as do married heads of 
households (in 2000). The value of the house has a negative and significant impact upon debt in both 
years, as found when considering individual level debt. Positive impacts upon household debt again 
come from sources similar to those found earlier - noticeably whether the head of household has a 
second job, has received a windfall (2000) and also contract type (2000). As previously found, current 
and lagged household income are always insignificant. Turning to the role of financial expectations for 
the heads of households, the results support our earlier findings with a positive and significant 
coefficient in both 1995 and 2000. Furthermore, household size is important in determining the amount 
of household debt in accordance with the findings of Crook (2001) and Gropp et al. (1997) for the U.S. 
The evidence presented in Table 2 conforms with our theoretical priors, in that optimistic 
financial expectations, have a positive and significant impact on debt both at the individual and 
household level. We now subject our empirical analysis to a number of robustness checks by 
considering causality and the dynamics of financial expectations, with the results shown in Table 3.  
 
Robustness Checks 
The direction of causality between financial expectations and debt is as yet unclear. For example, an 
individual (household) who has taken on debt may be more optimistic about their financial future 
simply because they are now better off. So any significant correlation between debt and financial 
expectations might arise because debt has a causal impact upon positive financial expectations rather 
than the other way around. To explore this possibility, we replace current financial expectations with 
their lagged indicator (see Table 3 Panel A). So, for example, lagged financial expectations, denoted by 
FEIt-1, in 1995 (period t) would be based upon the 1994 (period t-1) financial expectations value. 
In Table 3, Panels A and B adopt the same format as Table 2 with the first two columns 
reporting the results of individual level debt for 1995 and 2000, and the final two columns 
corresponding to household level debt. The control variables used are the same as in Table 2 but the 
  19  detailed results are not reported for brevity. Focusing upon the 1995 results, we find that the lagged 
financial expectations index has a positive and significant impact upon debt. In 2000, the lagged 
financial expectations index is again significant for both individual and household debt. These results 
imply that the causal flow runs from financial expectations to debt rather than the other way around. 
Specifically financial expectations operate through being increasingly financially optimistic supporting 
our earlier results.  
  In Table 3 Panel B, we introduce both current and lagged expectations to ascertain whether 
financial expectations influence debt formation in a dynamic manner and once again report selected 
results. Across each year and specification, the financial expectations index has a positive and 
significant impact upon debt. Noticeably the lagged financial expectations index outweighs current 
financial expectations in each year. The difference between the coefficients is however insignificant 
(see the chi-squared and F statistics resulting from testing equality between the FEI current and lagged 
coefficients). 
  In the final panel of Table 3, Panel C, Granger causality is explored by estimating both financial 
expectations and debt equations in 2000, across individuals and heads of households. Specifically, 
financial expectations are found to Granger cause debt if the amount of debt undertaken can be 
predicted with a greater degree of accuracy using past values of financial expectations than by not 
doing so. If financial expectations Granger cause debt then lagged values of the financial expectations 
index in the debt equation should be significant. Conversely, if debt Granger causes financial 
expectations, then lagged values of debt in the financial expectations equation should be significant. 
We focus exclusively on 2000 when estimating financial expectations (first and third columns of Table 
3) and debt equations (second and final columns of Table 3) and include the most recent lag.
35  
Throughout Panel C, the coefficient on lagged debt is always insignificant in the expectations equation, 
at the individual or household level.  Lagged financial expectations, on the other hand, are always 
significant in explaining current levels of debt. The positive estimated coefficient indicates that those 
with optimistic financial expectations take on more debt. Overall, these results suggest that optimistic 
financial expectations Granger cause debt. 
  20    To summarise, financial expectations appear to be an important determinant of debt 
accumulation and this finding is particularly robust. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the direction 
of causality is from financial expectations to debt.  
 
Growth in Debt and Financial Expectations 
Turning to the growth in debt between 1995 and 2000, initially expectations are defined by the 
financial expectations index, for each year, within the growth period ( ), as specified by 
equations (22) and (25). The distribution of financial expectations over the period are presented in the 
first two columns of Table 4. In each year, approximately 30% of individuals believed that their 
financial situation would be better off next year. The number of individuals with pessimistic financial 
expectations ranges between 219 (7.5%) in 2000 and 334 (11.5%) in 1995. 
j - hit EI F
In Table 5, column 1, we present selected results on the growth of individual debt, estimated by 
random effects [see equation (22)], which indicate how financial expectations impact upon the growth 
in debt within the growth period. An array of controls are entered into the regressions, but again the full 
results are omitted for brevity. Financial expectations towards the end of the growth period are 
significant, specifically those in 2000 and 1999 (FEIt and FEIt-1), concurring with our previous findings 
of a positive impact. In addition, unobserved intra-household effects (given by ρ) are also small. 
Expectations at the start of the period (1995) and during the middle years are insignificant, although the 
chi-squared statistic indicates that the null hypothesis, that all the coefficients are jointly insignificant, 
can be rejected at the 5 per cent level.  
  In Table 5, column 2, we now consider the growth in household debt over the period and 
whether there is a role for household financial expectations in influencing debt. The dependent variable 
is now household debt weighted by total household annual income over the period, and is distributed as 
shown in Figure 6. Financial expectations are now a summation of individuals’ financial expectations 
within the household, weighted by household size, and recoded to either ‘0=pessimistic’, ‘1=same’ or 
‘2=optimistic’. Equation (25) is estimated by OLS with robust standard errors. Household financial 
expectations in 2000 clearly have the largest effect on the growth in debt. Again a joint test of the 
  21  significance of all financial expectations within the growth period is significant – indicating that they 
influence the growth in household debt. 
 
Growth in Debt, Financial Expectations and Forecasting Success 
A natural question to ask is does it matter whether the financial expectations formulated by an 
individual are correct? To ascertain forecasting success, we firstly compare the prediction, i.e. 
expectations at t, with the answer to the following question at t+1: 
Would you say that you yourself are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago? 
Better off……………………………..1 
Worse off.…………………………….2 
About the same.………………………3 
Don’t know….………………………..4 
From our information about financial expectations, and the responses to the above question, we are able 
to formulate a series of binary dummies for whether individuals were correct or incorrect with respect 
to their financial expectations in each year. The distribution of correct financial expectations is shown 
in the final columns of Table 4. Clearly a higher proportion of individuals are correctly optimistic about 
their financial expectations next year compared to individuals with a correct pessimistic outlook.  
  The results of estimating equations (22) and (25), incorporating dummy variables for the 
accuracy of optimistic financial expectations are shown in Table 6.
36 At the individual level the only 
significant dummies are whether the individual made a correct optimistic forecast and incorrect 
optimistic forecast in 1999. In general, there is no role for the accuracy of financial expectations - 
evidence from a series of joint tests reveal that at the 5 per cent level neither the correct lags, incorrect 
lags, or both the correct and incorrect lags are significant. Similarly, at the household level there is no 
role for the accuracy of expectations as revealed by the joint F tests. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have explored an issue which is extremely topical amongst both economists and policy 
makers: the determinants of the amount of debt and the growth of debt at the individual and household 
level. Our main concern has been with the role of financial expectations. Our theoretical framework 
  22  predicts a positive association between optimistic financial expectations and the amount of debt taken 
on. We then explore the empirical determinants of debt and growth in debt at the individual and 
household level, using data from the 1995 and 2000 waves of the British Household Panel Survey. In 
particular, we extensively explore the influence of individual and household expectations, regarding 
their future financial situation, on debt.  
Our empirical findings provide convincing support for our theoretical priors in that optimistic 
financial expectations impact positively on the amount of outstanding debt and on the growth in debt. 
Our econometric results predict that individuals with optimistic financial expectations hold six (fifteen) 
times the amount of debt in 1995 (2000) relative to those with pessimistic financial expectations.
37 The 
corresponding figures weighted by income are the same in magnitude. Furthermore, our findings 
suggest that it is optimistic financial expectations per se which are important in influencing debt, rather 
than the accuracy of individuals’ predictions regarding their future financial situation.  
Our results may contribute to the understanding of why so many people encounter debt 
problems. Government policy could usefully be directed at identifying ways of curbing unrealistic 
financial optimism. However, careful targeting of such policies is necessary if adverse impacts on 
consumer expenditure and macroeconomic demand are to be avoided. In addition, further research into 
the formulation of financial expectations, and their influence on financial decision-making at the 
individual and household levels, is warranted.  
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1. Unsecured borrowing excludes mortgage loans. 
2. This is a similar organisation to the National Foundation for Credit Counselling in the U.S., but with a 
broader remit, including legal and social welfare advice.  
3. See the U.K. National Association for Citizens Advice Bureau report “Daylight Robbery”, available at 
http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk. 
4. For example, the financial structure of households from an international perspective is explored in Guiso 
et al. (2002) yet there is little reference to debt. 
5. Debt levels may also be influenced by tax laws specifically in the U.S., where some forms of borrowing 
are tax deductible as Poterba (2002) notes. However, this is not the case in the U.K. for non-mortgage debt. 
6. They argue that consumption decisions are dissociated from portfolio allocations within the household. 
Consequently, the “accountant”, who is in charge of household financial decision-making, attempts to 
control consumption expenditure by the “shopper”, through holding credit card balances as a fixed 
proportion of their limit. The purchases of the “shopper” are bound by the credit limit and outstanding 
balance of the credit card, with the interpretation that debt is incurred to prevent more spending and that 
credit card debt can co-exist with high levels of liquid savings.   29  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
7. Cox and Jappelli (1990) show that a proportion of this latent demand for credit may be met from private 
transfers. 
8. This is because U.S. debtors can choose to file for bankruptcy under one of two legal provisions (known 
as Chapter 7 and Chapter 13), which exempt the debtor from using either their wealth or their future earnings 
in repayment. The exemption limits for asset holdings vary across states. In the U.K., bankruptcy law is 
more stringent requiring all persons declaring bankruptcy to hand over control of their estate (liquid and 
illiquid financial assets) to a legal trustee. All assets, including residential accommodation and any business 
interests, may be disposed of or wound up by the trustee to meet their costs, creditors’ demands and the cost 
of bankruptcy proceedings. All income, above subsistence level, may be used in repayments. Hence, in the 
U.K., there is no incentive for opportunistic debt accumulation. 
9. That is, R = 1 + r, where 0 < r < 1 is the safe interest rate. For economy of notation we take the interest 
rate to be time invariant, but our model could easily be re-written with different values of the interest factor 
at different times. This is equivalent to assuming that borrowers and lenders have perfect foresight, i.e. 
Et(Rt+1) = Rt+1. In fact, we assume perfect foresight of third period income in the second version of the 
model. But we do not do so for the interest rate, partly to save notation - particularly in the life-cycle budget 
constraints – and, partly, because our focus is not on the inter-temporal profile of real interest rates.      
10 The lender's problem is indeterminate but it is straightforward to verify that expected lifetime utility is 
concave in L. Hence, there will be an interior solution. 
11. Here the consumer has no assets, only his/her income y2L, but at the end of the section we consider the 
case of consumers who hold assets that can be used as collateral. 
12. One could think of third period income as an endowment (e.g. an inheritance) or a fixed pension. Again, 
we implicitly assume perfect foresight of all future parameters (except second period income) for reasons of 
tractability. 
13. It will turn out that R=R' in equilibrium (see below), so effectively we are assuming y3>RL.   30  
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14. Alternatively, this would occur at a factor R' below or above R if the rate of time preference were above 
or below the safe interest rate, respectively. Again, we rule this out to save notation. 
15. This is common practice in personal loan refinancing in the U.K. 
16. That is  . 
17. That is  .  
18. Of course, the optimal size of L' chosen by a high income borrower need not equal that chosen by the 
low income borrower. In fact, typically they are different, as shown by equations (7) and (9). We denote 
them both by L' to save notation. 
19. Our approach can be compared to existing studies on debt, in particular Bertaut and Haliassos (2002), 
hereafter BH. Our loan extension is similar to BH’s concept of debt revolving, although not entirely 
equivalent, because debt in our model can and will increase, as well as decrease, both in size and as a result 
of carrying forward interest payments, whereas in BH it is a fixed proportion of the credit limit. Like BH we 
adopt a life cycle approach, with credit constraints depending on income. However, there are differences in 
focus and purpose, which are translated into different formal structures. BH consider credit card debt only, 
and explicitly separate consumer behaviour into accountant and shopper, whereas we focus on a broad 
concept of personal debt, implicitly treating consumers as shoppers. In BH debt co-exists with high liquidity, 
in our model loan extensions mostly apply to consumers who are short of liquidity and cannot repay their 
loan. The interest rate in BH is binary whilst the interest rate in our model is continuous and adjusts in 
equilibrium.  
20. This is exactly the same reasoning as in equations (4)-(5) - the lender must be no worse off than 
investing L in the safe capital market. 
21. Equation (15) also implies L < y2H/R' since L > y2L/R > y2L/R'.  
22. From Equation (14) ∂R'/∂p = -(R-y2L)/(1-p)
2 > 0 and ∂R'/∂y2L = -(1-p)/pL < 0 when L>0 (i.e. borrowing). 
23. Strictly speaking this happens if borrowers and lenders have different financial expectations, and if these 
beliefs differ sharply. With full information there is no immediate rationale for different beliefs and even   31  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
models with asymmetric information assume common beliefs of borrower and lender. Our model could still 
be easily reformulated with different values of p for borrower and lender: the basic intuition ∂L/∂p > 0 would 
continue to hold. This is because the direction of the response of consumption to both sets of beliefs is 
identical: without default the lender’s beliefs play no role since zero profit conditions in each period are 
trivially satisfied. Whilst with default, the borrower’s beliefs play no role since there is full consumption 
smoothing between C2H and C3H and between C1 and C2H. See equations (3) and (12) for the no default case. 
A proof is available from the authors for the default case.  
24. The proof is available from the authors on request.  
25. A further assumption of a sufficiently high penalty on defaulting borrowers if they switch lenders could 
strengthen the framework as well as adequately represent the economic and legal reality. 
26. The proof is available from the authors on request. We have also considered generalising our model to 
asymmetric information, but this would be beyond the scope of our study. In the case of personal debt it is 
unlikely that lenders have anything less than full information, given the credit scoring system on which 
lending is based. However, there exists a large literature on loan contracts with asymmetric information 
including Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Mookherjee and Png (1989), Jost (1996) and Krasa 
and Villamil (2000). Lenders and borrowers have common beliefs over future income, but whilst borrowers 
have full information, lenders cannot observe income realisations unless they pay some positive, usually 
fixed observation cost. The optimal loan contract generally involves random monitoring by the lender and a 
sequential rationality constraint imposed on the contract. This makes the lender indifferent to monitoring - 
thus solving a commitment problem - while also imposing sufficient punishment on borrowers to deter them 
from cheating. These contracts also tend to be renegotiation proof. Essentially, this approach would mean 
the inclusion, in our equilibrium model, of the appropriate incentive constraints. We expect that in such a 
general case the direction of the changes originating from a larger probability of high income would be the 
same.    32  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
27. Furthermore, the mean of the natural logarithm of the mortgage amount is much larger than that of the 
amount of debt in each year. The log of the mortgage amount in 1995 (2000) is 6.84 (6.52), which can be 
compared to the corresponding figures for debt in Table 1. 
28. For example, the Family Resources Survey contains information on mortgage repayments only whilst the 
Family Expenditure Survey contains information on personal loans only. 
29. Debt is observed at two distinct points in time and so is potentially a stock accumulated over n periods. 
30. Ideally, as pointed out by an anonymous referee, we would conduct separate analysis for the self-
employed given that they may incur business as well as personal debt. Unfortunately, the self-employed 
account for only 14% of our sample. To control for differences between employees and self-employees, we 
do include a self-employment dummy variable in our econometric analysis. 
31. Zero reported debt is included as zero in our dependent variable as there is no reported debt between zero 
and unity. Throughout the analysis we refer to debt as a logged variable following Gropp et al. (1997) due to 
the fact that the distribution of debt is highly skewed towards zero. 
32. An alternative approach, if the underlying decision to accumulate debt differs from that determining the 
minimal amount of debt, e.g. if zero debt reflects credit constraints, would be to adopt a sample selection 
model. However, we adopt the Tobit estimator on the basis that we do not have information on credit 
constraints.  
33. The dependent variable represents the log of the absolute value of debt growth, which is then signed to 
capture positive or negative growth. Since there is no growth between 0 and 1, zero growth is included as 
zero. 
34. As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the relationship between secured and unsecured debt is 
somewhat complicated. Individuals with housing equity may take out secured rather than unsecured debt, 
which may explain our finding that home ownership is associated with lower debt.   33  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
35. This is due to the fact that debt is only observed in 1995 and 2000. Thus, there are no lagged values of 
debt to use in Granger causality tests for 1995. In 2000, we are constrained to just one lag on debt, 1995, i.e. 
t-5. 
36. In addition to the covariates, given in Table 5, we control for those predicting that their financial 
situation is unchanged, leaving the omitted category as those with pessimistic financial expectations. 
37. To interpret the results in terms of size we estimated our model separately for individuals with optimistic 
and pessimistic financial expectations, constructing predicted debt for each group and year. We then 
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FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 3 





































   36  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
FIGURE 5 
Distribution of the Growth in Individual Debt, over 1995-2000, Weighted by Period Income 
Frequency 
Log(Growth in Individual Debt/total individual income), 1995 - 2000 











Log(Growth in Household Debt/total household income), 1995 - 2000
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  ALL INDIVIDUALS  (INDIVIDUALS WITH POSITIVE DEBT ONLY)
 
  1995 2000 
  MEAN STD  MAX MIN MEAN STD  MAX  MIN 
Ln (Debt)  3.18 (6.66)  3.50 (1.57)  11.15 (11.15)  0 (0.53)  3.11 (7.11)  3.69 (1.63)  10.92 (10.92)  0 (1.31) 
FEIt 1.20 (1.25)  0.62 (0.63)  2 (2)  0 (0)  1.23 (1.30)  0.56 (0.58)  2 (2)  0 (0) 
FEIt-1 1.19 (1.26)  0.62 (0.61)  2 (2)  0 (0)  1.26 (1.33)  0.59 (0.60)  2 (2)  0 (0) 
Age  39.9 (38.2)  10.4 (9.9)  61 (60)  19 (20)  43.4 (40.9)  10.2 (9.6)  65 (65)  24 (24) 
Age
2 1,707 (1,560)  838 (779)  3,721 (3,600)  361 (400)  1,989 (1,769)  895 (818)  4,225 (4,225)  576 (576) 
Male  0.46 (0.45)  0.50 (0.50)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.45 (0.46)  0.50 (0.50)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Married  0.69 (0.68)  0.46 (0.47)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.69 (0.65)  0.46 (0.48)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
No. Kids  0.72 (0.80)  0.99 (1.02)  5 (4)  0 (0)  0.67 (0.79)  0.96 (1.01)  6 (4)  0 (0) 
White  0.97 (0.98)  0.18 (0.15)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.96 (0.97)  0.19 (0.18)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Household size  1.83 (1.80)  0.77 (0.75)  5 (5)  1 (1)  1.64 (1.56)  0.65 (0.61)  4 (5)  1 (1) 
Unemployedt-1 0.01 (0.01)  0.10 (0.09)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.01 (0.01)  0.07 (0.06)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Car in house  0.92 (0.91)  0.27 (0.29)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.93 (0.92)  0.26 (0.26)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Self employed  0.14 (0.12)  0.35 (0.32)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.14 (0.13)  0.35 (0.33)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Permanent contract  0.88 (0.90)  0.32 (0.31)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.91 (0.93)  0.29 (0.25)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Joint debt  0.18 (0.35)  0.38 (0.48)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.10 (0.19)  0.30 (0.39)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Wealth Controls
            
Ln (SpouseIncome)  4.02 (4.06)  3.40 (3.40)  10.09 (8.72)  -2.30 (-2.30)  4.09 (4.13)  3.53 (3.52)  9.28 (9.21)  -2.30 (-2.30) 
Ln (Savings+Invest)  3.40 (3.23)  3.37 (3.19)  13.65 (12.54)  -0.17 (-0.17)  3.55 (3.45)  3.43 (3.30)  12.82 (11.62)  -0.30 (-0.30) 
Ln (Housevalue)  1.45 (0.89)  3.76 (3.02)  12.77 (12.04)  0 (0)  2.16 (1.06)  4.52 (3.35)  13.59 (13.16)  0 (0) 
Mortgage/Income  0.14 (0.17)  0.68 (0.97)  31.7 (31.73)  0 (0)  0.13 (0.15)  0.53 (0.56)  27.16 (27.01)  0 (0) 
Extra Mortgage  0.03 (0.04)  0.17 (0.20)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.05 (0.05)  0.21 (0.23)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Second job  0.11 (0.13)  0.32 (0.33)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.09 (0.11)  0.29 (0.32)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Windfall  0.48 (0.50)  0.50 (0.50)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.29 (0.29)  0.45 (0.45)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Lifetime Income Controls
            
Ln (Income)  6.41 (6.49)  1.02 (0.93)  9.70 (9.70)  -2.70 (0)  6.48 (6.59)  1.21 (1.13)  9.91 (9.91)  -2.83 (-2.83) 
Ln (Incomet-1)  6.42 (6.48)  0.99 (0.90)  9.25 (9.25)  0 (0)  6.26 (6.27)  1.17 (1.14)  9.25 (9.26)  0 (0) 
Ln (Incomet-2)  6.30 (6.35)  1.14 (1.04)  9.30 (8.65)  -2.64 (0)  6.17 (6.16)  1.27 (1.29)  9.30 (9.30)  -2.64 (0) 
Ln (Incomet-3)  6.21 (6.24)  1.31 (1.26)  8.95 (8.41)  0 (0)  6.07 (6.03)  1.43 (1.49)  8.95 (8.74)  -1.93 (0) 
Ln (Incomet-4)  6.13 (6.14)  1.40 (1.33)  9.04 (9.04)  0 (0)  5.99 (5.95)  1.50 (1.55)  9.04 (9.04)  0 (0) 
Firm size 1-24  0.27 (0.27)  0.45 (0.44)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.29 (0.29)  0.45 (0.45)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Firm size 25-99  0.22 (0.23)  0.41 (0.42)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.20 (0.19)  0.40 (0.39)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Firm size 100-499  0.20 (0.22)  0.40 (0.41)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.20 (0.22)  0.40 (0.41)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Degree  0.16 (0.15)  0.37 (0.36)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.19 (0.20)  0.39 (0.40)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Further Education  0.23 (0.26)  0.42 (0.44)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.32 (0.35)  0.46 (0.48)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
A’ Level  0.13 (0.12)  0.33 (0.33)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.10 (0.10)  0.31 (0.30)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
O’ Level  0.22 (0.24)  0.42 (0.43)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.18 (0.17)  0.39 (0.38)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
CSE  0.04 (0.05)  0.20 (0.21)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.03 (0.04)  018 (0.19)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Other Education  0.05 (0.05)  0.22 (0.22)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.04 (0.04)  0.20 (0.29)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Manager  0.15 (0.14)  0.35 (0.35)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.16 (0.17)  0.37 (0.37)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Professional  0.12 (0.13)  0.32 (0.33)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.11 (0.13)  0.32 (0.34)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Associate Professional  0.11 (0.11)  0.31 (0.32)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.12 (0.13)  0.32 (0.34)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Clerical  0.16 (0.17)  0.37 (0.38)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.15 (0.15)  0.36 (0.36)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Craftsman  0.11 (0.11)  0.32 (0.31)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.11 (0.11)  0.31 (0.31)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Personal  0.09 (0.10)  0.29 (0.30)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.09 (0.09)  0.28 (0.28)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Sales  0.07 (0.06)  0.25 (0.25)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.06 (0.04)  0.23 (0.21)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Energy  0.02 (0.02)  0.13 (0.14)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.01 (0.02)  0.12 (0.13)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Extraction  0.03 (0.03)  0.16 (0.17)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.03 (0.03)  0.17 (0.17)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Engineering  0.09 (0.10)  0.29 (0.29)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.08 (0.09)  0.27 (0.28)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Manufacturing  0.09 (0.09)  0.28 (0.29)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.08 (0.08)  0.27 (0.26)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Construction  0.05 (0.04)  0.22 (0.19)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.05 (0.04)  0.21 (0.20)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Distribution  0.17 (0.17)  0.38 (0.38)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.16 (0.16)  0.37 (0.36)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Transport  0.06 (0.05)  0.23 (0.23)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.06 (0.07)  0.25 (0.25)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
Finance  0.13 (0.14)  0.34 (0.35)  1 (1)  0 (0)  0.14 (0.14)  0.35 (0.35)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
  2,700 (1,289)  2,705 (1,183) 
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TABLE 2 
The Amount of Debt and Current Financial Expectations
a
  Sample=All Individuals  Sample=Head of Household 
  Ln (Individual Debt) RE Tobit  Ln (Household Debt) Tobit 
  1995 2000  1995  2000 
Intercept -6.892  (2.93)  * -3.256  (1.00)   -3.494  (1.21)   -1.647  (0.49)  
FEIt
b 0.661  (3.36)  *  0.898  (3.34)  *  0.577  (2.56)  *  0.683  (2.51)  * 
Age 0.104  (1.02)   -0.041  (0.30)   0.031  (0.25)   -0.124  (0.87)  
Age
2 -0.002  (1.50)   -0.001  (0.42)   -0.001  (0.52)   0.001  (0.18)   
Male -0.304  (1.04)   0.615  (1.78)  # -0.815 (2.13)  * -0.020 (0.05)   
Married -1.009  (2.78)  * -1.262  (3.08)  * -0.664 (1.56)   -1.229  (2.82)  * 
No. Kids  -0.064  (0.44)   0.202  (1.16)   0.072  (0.42)   0.021  (0.11)   
White 1.484  (2.06)  * 0.805  (1.00)   1.192  (1.55)   1.307  (1.54)   
Household size  -0.064  (0.36)   -0.592  (2.20)  * 1.517  (5.96)  * 2.446  (7.09)  * 
Unemployedt-1 -0.717  (0.56)   0.223  (0.11)   -1.707  (1.10)   1.094  (0.51)   
Car in house  -0.086  (0.19)   0.508  (0.87)   0.334  (0.67)   0.908  (1.53)   
Self employed  -0.699  (1.70)  # 0.085  (0.18)   -1.036  (2.13)  * 0.441  (0.87)   
Permanent contract  -0.032  (0.07)   1.536  (2.46)  * 0.030  (0.06)   1.284  (1.90)  # 
Wealth Controls                     
Ln (SpouseIncome)  -0.064  (1.50)   -0.032  (0.67)   0.004  (0.10)   0.016  (0.31)   
Ln (Savings+Invest)  -0.088  (2.28)  * -0.011  (0.25)   -0.083  (1.89)  # -0.032 (0.66)   
Ln (Housevalue)  -0.146  (3.90)  * -0.265  (6.77)  * -0.131 (2.78)  * -0.265 (6.09)  * 
Mortgage/Income 0.330  (2.03)  * 0.004  (1.31)   0.356  (2.31)  * 0.003  (0.99)   
Extra Mortgage  1.522  (2.27)  * 0.053  (0.08)   0.847  (1.13)   0.471  (0.69)   
Second job  0.700  (1.89)  # 1.308  (2.72)  * 0.973  (2.24)  * 1.114  (2.12)  * 
Windfall 0.237  (0.98)   0.680  (2.09)  * 0.050  (0.18)   0.821  (2.36)  * 
Lifetime Income Controls                        
Ln (Income)  0.264  (1.48)   0.281  (1.78)  # 0.173  (0.83)   0.041 (0.26)   
Ln (Incomet-1) 0.203  (1.13)   0.083  (0.52)   -0.161 (0.71)   -0.119  (0.67)   
Ln (Incomet-2) 0.041  (0.29)   0.070  (0.47)   -0.002 (0.01)   0.014 (0.08)   
Ln (Incomet-3) 0.087  (0.74)   -0.058  (0.44)   0.080 (0.60)   -0.182  (1.38)   
Ln (Incomet-4) -0.003  (0.02)   -0.063  (0.53)   -0.073 (0.62)   0.147 (1.16)   
Highest education  yes (6) 
Occupation  yes (7) 
Industry  yes (8) 
Firm size  yes (3) 
Other Controls  
Region  yes (10) 
Month of interview  yes (8) 
Joint responsibility  yes 
Observations 2,700  2,705  1,561  1,779 
() 68
2 χ   712.49  p=[0.000]  486.56  p=[0.000]  364.17  p=[0.000]  330.79  p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R squared  –  –  0.0526  0.0432 
ρ  0.085 0.057  –  – 
Left censored obs.  1,411  1,522  645  816 
a *, # denote 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance, respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
Causality Tests and Dynamics (Selected Results)
a
  Sample=All Individuals  Sample=Head of Household 
  Ln (Individual Debt) RE Tobit  Ln (Household Debt) Tobit 
  1995 2000 1995 2000 
Panel A
b           
Intercept -7.400  (3.15)  * -3.876 (1.18)   -3.944 (2.36)  * -2.127  (0.63)  
FEIt-1 0.732  (3.69)  * 0.949 (3.71) *0 . 7 0 5 (3.12)  * 0.719  (2.73) *
() 66
2 χ   714.31  p=[0.000]  488.10  p=[0.000]  367.32  p=[0.000]  331.92  p=[0.000] 
ρ  0.084 0.056  –  – 
Panel B
b           
Intercept -8.090  (3.42)  * -4.533 (1.38)   -4.569 (1.77)  # -2.659  (0.79)  
FEIt 0.486  (2.36)  * 0.673 (2.47) *0 . 3 9 1 (2.65)  * 0.502  (1.76) #
FEIt-1 0.584  (2.81)  * 0.757 (2.84) *0 . 5 7 8 (2.42)  * 0.569  (2.06) *
H0: FEIt=FEIt-1⇒   () 1
2 χ 0.09  p=[0.7687]  0.04  p=[0.8459]  – – 
H0: FEIt=FEIt-1⇒ F(1, 1493)  – –  0.23    p=[0.6291]  0.02  p=[0.8830] 
() 67
2 χ   719.45  p=[0.000]  493.66  p=[0.000]  370.04  p=[0.000]  335.02  p=[0.000] 
ρ  0.083 0.056  –  – 
Observations  2,700 2,705 1,561 1,779 
Left censored obs.  1,411  1,522  645  816 
 
Sample=All Individuals, Year t=2000  Sample=Head of Household, Year t=2000 
 FEIt Ln (Debtt) FEIt Ln (Debtt) Tobit 
  RE Ordered Probit  RE Tobit  Ordered Probit  (household debt)  
Panel C
b     
Intercept  –  -2.864 (1.96)  # –  -3.011 (0.97)  
Ln (Debtt-5) 0.013  (1.53)   0.554 (13.40)  *0 . 0 0 5  (0.54)   0.504 (11.58) *
FEIt-1 0.723  (12.27)  * 0.746 (3.04)  *0 . 6 4 6   (12.68)  * 0.527 (2.07) *
() 64 2 χ   400.76  p=[0.000]  648.35  p=[0.000]  337.72  p=[0.000]  420.53  p=[0.000] 
ρ  0.346 0.047  –  – 
Observations 2,705  1,779 
a *, # denote 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Financial Expectations Over the Growth Period 1995-2000
a
 FINANCIAL  EXPECTATIONS  (t) CORRECT  FINANCIAL  EXPECTATIONS  (t+1=t) 
  BETTER OFF  WORSE OFF  SAME  OPTIMISTIC  PESSIMISTIC  SAME 
2000 (t) 837  219  1,766  540 158  1,931 
1999 (t-1) 922  240 1,658  659  158  1,781 
1998 (t-2) 944  239 1,622  631  158  1,708 
1997 (t-3) 909  250 1,657  626  159  1,688 
1996 (t-4) 937  267 1,608  685  192  1,682 
1995 (t-5) 928  334 1,556  628  246  1,556 
a The sample size for each year is 2,906. 
TABLE 5 





Ln (Growth Weighted Debt) RE
Sample=Head of Household 
Ln (Growth Weighted Household Debt) OLS 
Intercept 0.150 (0.30)  0.168  (0.24)  
FEIt 0.237 (2.81) * 0.579  (3.31) * 
FEIt-1 0.314 (2.39) *  -0.118  (0.64)  
FEIt-2 0.030 (0.23)   0.204  (1.14)  
FEIt-3 0.069 (0.53)   -0.052  (0.30)  
FEIt-4 -0.155 (1.22)   0.368  (2.15) * 
FEIt-5 -0.034 (0.29)   0.155  (0.96)  
H0: All FEI Coef.=0 ⇒   () 6
2 χ 14.43  p=[0.020]  – 
H0: All FEI Coef.=0 ⇒ F(6, 1586)  – 3.08    p=[0.005] 
Observations 2,906  1,633 
Wald    () 46 2 χ 74.50  p=[0.005]  – 
R squared  0.0254  0.0472 
ρ  0.112 – 
a Controls are the growth in: income; spouses’ income; mortgage as a proportion of income; savings and investments, 
value of house. Always: joint debt; had car; had windfalls; married. New: car; windfalls; split & join a cohabiting 
relationship or marriage. Controls for male, white, educational controls, industry, occupation, whether moved region, 
different month of interview and self employed. t=2000. 
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TABLE 6 





Ln (Growth Weighted Debt) 
RE 
Sample=Head of Household 
Ln (Growth Weighted 
Household Debt) OLS 
Intercept -0.243 (0.37)  0.164  (0.17)  
Correct Optimistic Financial Predictiont 0.514 (1.56)  1.026  (2.11) * 
Correct Optimistic Financial Predictiont-1 0.852 (2.66) * 0.382  (0.79)  
Correct Optimistic Financial Predictiont-2 -0.353 (1.09)  0.128  (0.26)  
Correct Optimistic Financial Predictiont-3 -0.243 (0.78)  -0.384  (0.83)  
Correct Optimistic Financial Predictiont-4 -0.213 (0.62)  -0.741  (1.62)  
Correct Optimistic Financial Predictiont-5 0.073 (0.26  0.347  (0.81)  
Incorrect Optimistic Financial Predictiont 0.373 (1.18)  0.906  (1.94) # 
Incorrect Optimistic Financial Predictiont-1 0.558 (2.77) * 0.177  (0.38)  
Incorrect Optimistic Financial Predictiont-2 0.055 (0.18)  0.206  (0.43)  
Incorrect Optimistic Financial Predictiont-3 -0.006 (0.02)  -0.166  (0.36)  
Incorrect Optimistic Financial Predictiont-4 -0.310 (1.02)  -0.821  (1.83) # 
Incorrect Optimistic Financial Predictiont-5 -0.245 (0.87)  0.036  (0.09)  
H0: All Correct Coef.=0 ⇒   () 6
2 χ 11.73  p=[0.068] – 
H0: All Incorrect Coef.=0 ⇒    () 6
2 χ 6.83  p=[0.337]  – 
H0: All Correct & Incorrect Coef.=0 ⇒    () 12
2 χ 16.39  p=[0.174]  – 
H0: All Correct Coef.=0 ⇒ F(6, 1568)  – 1.58    p=[0.149] 
H0: All Incorrect Coef.=0 ⇒ F(6, 1568)  – 1.30    p=[0.252] 
H0: All Correct & Incorrect Coef.=0 ⇒ F(12, 1568)  – 0.95    p=[0.491] 
Observations 2,906  1,633 
Wald    () 64 2 χ 93.60  p=[0.009]  – 
R squared  0.032  0.047 
ρ  0.1187 – 
a We also include the other explanatory variables, as in Table 5, plus controls for correct and incorrect no change in 
financial situation – thus the base becomes pessimistic financial expectations. t=2000. 
b *, # denote 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 